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While economic theory has been applied to numerous topics in economic history, there
are very few attempts to interpret major macroeconomic shocks from the perspective
of standard Keynesian theory. This paper presents a history of aggregate demand and
supply shocks spanning 1900 – 2016 for the United Kingdom, whose signs are identified
using economic theory. We utilise sign restrictions derived from an AD-AS framework
consistent with the workhorse New Keynesian model, and demonstrate how they can
be used to identify the signs of structural shocks. The existence of 33 large shocks is
inferred from estimated vector autoregressions, comprising 21 demand shocks and 12
supply shocks. We find that aggregate supply shocks were important in the late 1920s
and early 1970s, which we attribute to changes in the bargaining power of labour. We
also identify positive aggregate demand shocks in the mid-1970s, which we attribute
to fiscal policy and suggest that these shocks will have exacerbated the inflationary
effects of the 1973 oil price crisis, while mitigating its unemployment effects.
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1 Introduction
John Habakkuk, writing in 1971 on the method of model-building in economic theory, ob-
served that it was somewhat unusual that formal models were seldom used in the interpre-
tation of economic history:
“Economic theory characteristically proceeds by building a model, a simplified,
abstract version of the real world . . . In view of its power one should perhaps be
surprised at the little use made of this method (and its results) in the explanation
of past economic events, either by economists or historians.” (Habakkuk, 1971,
pp. 305).
Since then, the field of cliometrics – “the application of economic theory and quantitative
methods to the study of history” – has come to play an important role in both economic
history and theoretical economics (Goldin, 1995, pp. 191). Researchers in the field have
applied economic theory to the history of economic growth, international trade, financial
markets, business cycles, and many other topics (see Diebolt & Haupert, 2019). Specific
events in history are, of course, also regularly discussed with reference to economic theory.
Somewhat surprising, however, is the rarity of attempts to interpret long historical series of
macroeconomic shocks using standard macroeconomic theory.
In this paper, we offer an interpretation of the history of aggregate demand and supply
shocks in the United Kingdom (UK) from a Keynesian perspective. While previous work
has studied demand and supply shocks in the UK from a variety of angles, we ask a specific
question: what does the aggregate demand/aggregate supply (AD-AS) framework implied
by benchmark macroeconomic models tell us about the sources of inflation and unemploy-
ment events in British economic history? Specifically, we estimate vector autoregressive
models (VAR models) in the unemployment and inflation rates, and identify the signs of
certain structural shocks by applying sign restrictions to the VAR forecast errors. Our
sign restrictions are derived from a baseline AD-AS framework that is consistent with the
workhorse New Keynesian model, as well as various Old and Post Keynesian models.
Our research question is related to the recent study by Stuart (2019), who presents a
history of aggregate demand and aggregate supply shocks for Britain and Ireland spanning
1922 – 1979. Stuart (2019) is interested in examining the dependence of the Irish economy
on the British economy, and uses a bivariate VAR model in GDP and the price level in
which aggregate demand and supply shocks are identified by assuming a unit price elastic-
ity of demand. While we follow Stuart (2019) by interpreting our estimated shock series
with reference to the narrative historical record, we use considerably weaker identification
assumptions consistent with a wide variety of models. Our question is also related to Mathy
(2020), who uses data on the inter-war American economy to identify the role that uncer-
tainty shocks played in the Great Depression. As uncertainty shocks can be interpreted as
a type of aggregate demand shock (Leduc & Liu, 2016), Mathy’s results can be compared
to any inter-war shocks uncovered by our approach using British data.
Aside from Stuart (2019), the small number of studies that derive series of aggregate de-
mand and supply shocks using British historical data includes Karras (1993, 1994), Bergman
(1996), and Liu & Mumtaz (2011). Karras (1993) presents a history of demand and supply
shocks for the UK, Italy and Sweden between 1868 and 1987 identified via the Blanchard-
Quah restriction that aggregate demand shocks have no permanent effect on output (Blan-
chard & Quah, 1989). Karras (1994) applies a similar identifying assumption to the UK,
France and Germany between 1960 and 1988, while Bergman (1996) follows the same ap-
proach for the UK, Germany, Japan, Sweden and the USA between 1960 and 1990. Liu &
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Mumtaz (2011), in comparison, present a historical decomposition of the output gap and
inflation rate using a fully specified New Keynesian DSGE model.1 Finally, it is also worth
noting that a number of papers have examined the applicability of Keynesian AD-AS models
to the UK economy, including Turner (1993), Funke & Hall (1998), Turner (1999), Jenkins
& Tsoukis (2000), and Cover & Mallick (2012). Unlike these papers, which are mainly con-
cerned with the identification of impulse response functions, we are specifically focused on
the identification and interpretation of historical shocks.
Building on these papers, we make two contributions. First, we use a long time series of
unemployment and inflation spanning the years 1900 – 2016, which provides a comprehensive
picture of the type of shocks that have hit the UK economy over time. Second, and more
importantly, we utilise a rarely explored feature of sign restrictions in VAR models: their
capacity to identify the signs of structural shocks. While sign restrictions are almost always
used to identify a set of impulse response functions, we show that they can also yield
economically interesting information about the nature of shocks. Specifically, we use sign
restrictions to pin down the direction of macroeconomic shocks, allowing us to classify them
as positive or negative aggregate demand or aggregate supply shocks. This approach requires
considerably weaker identification assumptions than point-identification, making use of the
sign restrictions implied by the familiar AD-AS framework and very little else. This element
of our contribution is inspired by Charles Manski’s approach to partial identification:
“Social scientists and policymakers alike seem driven to draw sharp conclusions,
even when these can be generated only by imposing much stronger assumptions
than can be defended. We need to develop a greater tolerance for ambiguity.
We must face up to the fact that we cannot answer all of the questions that we
ask.” (Manski, 1995, pp. 7-8).
Our partial identification approach identifies the signs of certain shocks (e.g., the existence
of a negative demand shock in 2009), but not the exact magnitude of those shocks. However,
as our partial history only requires very weak assumptions, it ought to be more reliable than
a complete history of shocks that imposes strong assumptions.
Overall, we find that aggregate demand shocks appear to be more important than aggre-
gate supply shocks, in the sense that most of the large forecast errors implied by our VAR
models are associated with demand shocks. Our results also support a number of well-known
interpretations of UK economic history, including the identification of the two World Wars
as positive demand shocks, the identification of the Great Depression and Great Recession
as negative demand shocks, and the identification of the 1979 oil price events as a negative
supply shock. In addition, we provide a new perspective on two major episodes:
a. Aggregate supply shocks in 1927 and 1971, which we attribute to changes in the
bargaining power of organised labour;
b. Aggregate demand shocks in 1974 and 1975, which we attribute to expansionary fiscal
policy.
These examples illustrate two important uses of our empirical approach: its ability to high-
light certain shocks that rarely make it into the ‘textbook’ accounts of major macroeconomic
events, and its ability to provide a new perspective on well-known events.
1After an initial literature search, we searched the set of papers that cited Karras (1993, 1994) or Bergman
(1996) for papers that presented histories of aggregate demand and supply shocks for the UK. There also
exist papers that do this for other countries, e.g. Fackler & McMillin (1998) for the USA.
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The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 derives an aggregate demand and supply
framework from the workhorse New Keynesian model, and explains the expected effects of
aggregate demand and supply shocks on economic activity and inflation. Section 3 then ex-
plains how sign restrictions derived from the workhorse New Keynesian model can be used
to infer the signs of structural shocks from a reduced-form VAR model. Section 4 discusses
the reduced-form VAR estimation and presents the sample of reduced-form residuals. Sec-
tion 5 then presents the history of identified structural shock signs, and interprets a subset
of the shocks using secondary references from economic history (the full set of shocks are
interpreted in appendix B). Section 6 presents an alternative approach based on impulse
indicator saturation, and demonstrates that the shocks derived using this method are sim-
ilar to those derived in section 5. Finally, section 7 summarises our findings and presents
concluding remarks.
2 AD-AS and the New Keynesian model
Despite criticism following the 2008 financial crisis, the workhorse New Keynesian model
continues to form the basis of much theoretical and empirical macroeconomics, as well as
an important part of economic pedagogy (Fontana & Setterfield, 2009; Gaĺı, 2018). In its
reduced form, it boils down to a familiar AD-AS framework that can also be derived from
other well-known macroeconomic theories. Given its present popularity, we will use the New
Keynesian model as a starting point to derive the AD-AS model that informs our empirical
approach.
At its heart, the workhorse New Keynesian model is a simple three-equation model,
made up of a dynamic IS-curve, a Phillips curve, and a monetary policy rule:
yt = Etyt+1 − σ(it − Etπt+1) + gt, (IS)
πt = βEtπt+1 + κyt + ηt, (PC)
it = φπt + εt, (MP)
where yt denotes the output gap (defined as the difference between actual and potential
output); πt denotes inflation; it denotes the nominal interest rate; gt, ηt and εt are aggregate
demand, aggregate supply, and monetary policy shocks, respectively; and σ, β, κ and φ are
positive parameters. As all the variables are in deviations from their steady state values,
we omit intercept terms. We have assumed in (MP) that the central bank is a strict infla-
tion targetter, but incorporating output into the monetary policy rule does not change the
relevant results. For a detailed derivation and discussion, see Gaĺı (2008).
A determinate solution to a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model like the
New Keynesian model is one in which the endogenous variables are functions of the pre-
determined variables and shock processes. As there are no pre-determined variables in the
simple New Keynesian model – e.g., there is no capital stock – a determinate solution is one











for some 3 × 3 matrix B – see e.g. Blanchard & Kahn (1980). As a result, if the shock
processes are AR(p), then a determinate solution to the New Keynesian model is a VAR(p)
model in which the lag length p is inherited from the shock processes. For example, if gt,
ηt and εt follow AR(1) processes, then the solution to the New Keynesian model is of the
form,
zt = Czt−1 +Dξt,
where zt = [yt, πt]
′, C and D are 2 × 2 matrices and ξt is a 2 × 1 white noise vector – see
e.g. Dennis (2005). Note that in this particular case the interest rate it is dropped from the
solution, as it is a static variable which can be substituted out.
To understand the sign structure of the responses of output and inflation to the various
shocks hitting the economy, consider the simple case in which gt, ηt and εt are mean zero
white noise. This means that Etgt+1 = Etηt+1 = Etεt+1 = 0, and therefore – given the
determinate solution form described above – that Etyt+1 = Etπt+1 = 0. Thus, the model
with white noise shocks simplifies to,
yt = −σit + gt,
πt = κyt + ηt,
it = φπt + εt,
which, by substituting out it from the IS-curve, yields an AD-AS model,
yt = −σφπt + dt, (AD)
πt = κyt + ηt, (AS)
where ηt is the aggregate supply shock and dt = gt − σεt is the aggregate demand shock.
Note that an increase in dt is a positive aggregate demand shock, but an increase in ηt is
more commonly referred to as a negative aggregate supply shock, as its initial effect is to
increase costs (and therefore inflation, ceteris paribus).
It is worth pointing out that this reduced-form AD-AS model is fairly generic, and can
be arrived at in a number of ways. In particular, as demonstrated in Dutt & Skott (1996),
the Old Keynesian neoclassical synthesis model, the Monetarist model, the New Classical
model, as well as several Post Keynesian models can all be formulated as an AD-AS reduced
form. Theoretical differences arise with respect to the behavioural foundations, including
the use of the price level versus the inflation rate, and the expected elasticities of the demand
and supply functions. But in general – and in the New Keynesian model – the aggregate
demand curve is downward-sloping in (yt, πt) space as the central bank raises interest rates
when inflation is above its target, and the aggregate supply curve is upward-sloping as firms
increase prices when the output gap is positive. This sign structure is consistent with the
traditional neoclassical synthesis model and with Post Keynesian models in which inflation
is the outcome of distributional conflict (e.g. Hein & Stockhammer, 2010).
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With this sign structure, a positive aggregate demand shock increases output and infla-
tion while a positive aggregate supply shock increases output and decreases inflation. This













implying that demand shocks make output and inflation move in the same direction, and
supply shocks make output and inflation move in opposite directions.
3 Identifying the signs of demand and supply shocks
In our outline of the New Keynesian model in section 2, we framed the discussion in terms
of the deviations of output and inflation from their steady state values. For the empirical
exercise, we replace output with the unemployment rate, as – for reasons discussed in more
detail below – we expect historical unemployment data to be more reliable than historical
estimates of GDP. Consider, therefore, a structural VAR model in the unemployment rate




Aizt−i + εt, (1)
where zt = (ut, πt)





′ is a mean zero white noise vector process with variance
covariance matrix Ωε. From (1) we have,





zt − E[zt|zt−1, ..., zt−p] = A−1εt = vt, (3)





′ are the reduced form innovations, or one-step-ahead forecast errors.
Ordinarily, a VAR practitioner has to make certain assumptions on A and Ωε to identify
the elements of A from the information contained in the variance-covariance matrix of vt.
This is because A has four elements, but there are only three elements in the (symmetric)
variance-covariance matrix Ωε. A popular source of restrictions is the type of sign informa-
tion derived in section 2, in which AD-AS theory implies that demand shocks make output
and inflation move in the same direction, and supply shocks make output and inflation move
in opposite directions. Mountford (2005), for example, uses a sign-restricted VAR model
to investigate the effects of UK monetary policy, in which positive aggregate supply shocks
are assumed to increase output and decrease the price level, and positive aggregate demand
shocks are assumed to increase output and increase the price level. However, as discussed
by Fry & Pagan (2011) and Lütkepohl & Kilian (2017), sign restrictions only result in set
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identification, not point identification. In other words, sign restrictions narrow down the set
of structural impulse response functions, variance decompositions, and historical decompo-
sitions that are consistent with the reduced-form VAR, but do not uniquely identify them.
Non-sign information therefore has to be appealed to in order to pin down unique impulse
response functions, variance decompositions, and historical decompositions.
Mountford (2005), for example, follows Uhlig (2005) by using a loss function approach
to pin down unique ‘representative’ impulse response functions following set identification
by sign restrictions. Essentially, out of the set of impulse response functions which satisfies
the sign restrictions, this method chooses the functions which satisfy the sign criteria by
the largest margin. The non-sign information appealed to in this example is a loss function,
which as the author admits, is arbitrary and does not follow from the theoretical model
itself (Mountford, 2005, pp. 602). Fry & Pagan (2011) observe that any solution to the
problem of set identification requires the introduction of extra information over and above
the information contained in the sign restrictions. Bayesian approaches are the most common
way to introduce this non-sign information, but as recently discussed in Wolf (2020), the
popular Haar prior over impulse response functions identified using sign restrictions may
well lead to misleading inference.
Although rarely exploited, there is in fact some unambiguous and economically inter-
esting inference that can be gleaned from sign restrictions without recourse to non-sign
information (Calvert Jump, 2018). While much of the VAR-literature has focused on the
limited use of sign restrictions for identifying impulse response functions, sign restrictions
can also be employed to identify the signs of structural shocks. To see this, recall the basic
New Keynesian model discussed in section 2, which implies that a positive aggregate de-
mand shock increases output and increases inflation while a positive aggregate supply shock
increases output and decreases inflation. Recalling that we have replaced output with the
unemployment rate, and assuming that unemployment is negatively related to output, we







where α > 0 and β > 0, implying that unemployment is increasing in inflation and inflation


























Consistent with our discussion of ηt in section 2, we will refer to ε
d
t < 0 as a positive demand
shock, as this corresponds to a decrease in unemployment, and εst < 0 as a positive supply
shock, as this corresponds to a decrease in inflation. Using (5), consider the implications of
the four possible combinations of structural shock signs:
1: εdt < 0, ε
s
t < 0 =⇒ vut = εdt + α1+αβ ε
s








2: εdt < 0, ε
s
t > 0 =⇒ vut = εdt + α1+αβ ε
s








3: εdt > 0, ε
s
t < 0 =⇒ vut = εdt + α1+αβ ε
s









4: εdt > 0, ε
s
t > 0 =⇒ vut = εdt + α1+αβ ε
s








To summarise, a positive demand shock and positive supply shock (case 1) results in a
negative unemployment forecast error and an inflation forecast error of unknown sign. A
positive demand shock and negative supply shock (case 2) results in an unemployment
forecast error of unknown sign and a positive inflation forecast error. A negative demand
shock and a positive supply shock (case 3) yields an unemployment forecast error of unknown
sign and a negative inflation forecast error. Finally, a negative demand shock and a negative
supply shock (case 4) results in a positive unemployment forecast error and an inflation error
of unknown sign.
Working backwards from cases 1 – 4 above, it is straightforward to deduce the following
results:
A: vut < 0, v
π
t > 0 =⇒ εdt < 0,
B: vut > 0, v
π
t < 0 =⇒ εdt > 0,
C: vut > 0, v
π
t > 0 =⇒ εst > 0,
D: vut < 0, v
π
t < 0 =⇒ εst < 0.
To summarise, a negative unemployment forecast error and a positive inflation forecast
error (case A) imply the existence of a positive demand shock, and nothing can be said
about the sign of the supply shock. A positive unemployment forecast error and a negative
inflation forecast error (case B) imply a negative demand shock, and the sign of the supply
shock is unknown. A positive unemployment forecast error and a positive inflation forecast
error (case C) imply a negative supply shock, and nothing can be said about the sign of
the demand shock. Finally, a negative unemployment forecast error and negative inflation
forecast error (case D) imply a positive supply shock, and the sign of the demand shock is
unknown.
It is also straightforward to infer the results in cases A – D graphically, as illustrated in
figure 1. This shows four standard AD-AS diagrams, corresponding to cases 1 – 4 above,
with the forecast errors of unemployment and inflation on the horizontal and vertical axes
rather than the observed unemployment and inflation rates. As the models considered
here are linear, the reader can think of the graphs as showing observed unemployment and
inflation rates on the horizontal and vertical axes, respectively, with their expected values
at the origin.
Importantly, these results have been arrived at solely with the use of sign restrictions
derived from a standard AD-AS model. No non-sign information has been appealed to,
and it is also worth noting that no assumptions have been made on the variance-covariance
matrix of the structural shocks – see Cover et al. (2006) or Enders & Hurn (2007) for papers
arguing that structural demand and supply shocks in AD-AS models should not be modelled
as uncorrelated. Based on this identification strategy, reduced-form residuals v̂ut and v̂
π
t can
be estimated from a VAR to infer the signs of aggregate demand and aggregate supply
shocks. In the sequel we focus on large forecast errors to mitigate inferential problems
related to small forecast errors. Given our series of VAR forecast errors and identification
strategy, we can then interpret the implied structural shock signs using secondary sources




































Figure 1: Cases 1 – 4 in section 3. Note the illustrations use differences in the size of the
supply shock, but in general the results follow from differences in the relative size of the
demand and supply shocks and the magnitudes of α and β.
4 A VAR model in unemployment and inflation
A reduced form VAR model in the unemployment rate and inflation rate is estimated from
1900 – 2016, using the Bank of England’s ‘millennium of macroeconomic data’ dataset.2 This
long sample period allows a number of important sources of shocks to be contained within
the sample, including the financial turbulence of the 1920s and 1930s, the two World War
periods, the high inflation episodes during the 1970s and the Great Recession of 2009. Figure
2 plots the two series. The rapid inflation during and after the First World War followed
by the rapid deflation in the 1920s and 1930s are both visible, as is the unemployment
peak of 15.4% in 1932. The prolonged period of low unemployment and decreasing inflation
following the end of the Second World War is also evident, followed by the rapid increase
in inflation during the late 1960s and early 1970s, culminating in the oil price shocks of the
1970s. The sample ends with the relatively high unemployment rates following the early
1980s recession, and the Great Recession following the 2008 financial crisis.
2Specifically, this is the millenniumofdata v3 final.xlsx sheet, downloaded on 25/08/2017 11.37am from
www.bankofengland.co.uk/research/Pages/datasets/default.aspx. The LFS consistent measure of the un-
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Figure 2: UK unemployment rates and inflation rates, 1900 – 2016.
We use the unemployment rate rather than GDP because, given the long time series we
employ, we expect the former variable to be more accurately measured than the latter. In
the Bank of England dataset, real GDP estimates are taken from Solomou & Weale (1991)
between 1900 and 1913, Sefton & Weale (1995) between 1920 and 1947, and national statis-
tics thereafter, with a ‘compromise estimator’ used for the First World War and immediate
post-war period. As argued by Solomou & Ristuccia (2004), there are significant differences
between output, expenditure and income estimates of GDP prior to the advent of centralised
national statistics, and the implied measurement errors are unlikely to be random. As a
result, different ways of reconciling the estimates can yield very different GDP figures. Fur-
thermore, as discussed in chapter 5 of Sefton & Weale (1995), the underlying data on which
pre-War output, expenditure and income estimates are based are themselves taken from
a variety of sources on consumer expenditure, capital formation, wages and salaries, and
industrial output. This reflects the absence of modern national accounting in the UK prior
to the Second World War.
Unemployment figures, in comparison, are somewhat more straightforward to estimate.
The Bank of England dataset uses estimates from Boyer & Hatton (2002) and Feinstein
(1972) between 1900 and 1949, and national statistics thereafter. The Boyer & Hatton
(2002) and Feinstein (1972) estimates are partly based on trade union unemployment rates,
which were also used in official Board of Trade statistics. Boyer & Hatton (2002) extended
these figures by using employment data for non-unionised sectors, alongside labour force
weights based on the decennial census. Given the conceptual simplicity of employment and






























Statistic p-value χ2 statistic p-value Statistic p-value
8.18 0.09 46.9 0.00 104.22 0.00
Tests employed: Serial correlation=Lagrange Multiplier; Het-
eroskedasticity=White (no cross terms); Normality=Doornik-
Hansen. Only first-order autocorrelation is reported.
Box 1: Estimation output for VAR in unemployment rate and inflation rate.
data from trade unions, the Inspectors of Mines, the Board of Trade and others, alongside
official statistics from the census, one would expect unemployment to be more accurately
measured than GDP. This is most likely to be the case during the First and Second World
Wars, in which we are certain that full employment was approximately achieved, but rela-
tively uncertain about the exact level of real GDP.
The VAR estimates are summarised in box 1. Unit root tests are inconclusive, although
there is no obvious drift in either the unemployment or inflation series. Both the Akaike
and Bayesian information criteria indicate a two lag model. The intercept terms were
dropped in the final estimations because they were statistically insignificant at the 5% level,
and the inflation equation became slightly more stable when the intercept was excluded.
Intuitively, if both unemployment and inflation follow a unit root process with no drift,
then the intercept estimator is
√
T -consistent, so converges at a slower rate than the T -
consistent slope estimator. Including intercepts appears to increase parameter instability in
our VAR estimates, and therefore they are excluded. However, the residual series from the
VARs estimated with and without intercepts are almost identical; see the scatter matrix
and kernel densities in figure D2 in appendix D.
The model does not suffer from autocorrelation at the 5% level, but does exhibit het-
eroskedasticity. This is unsurprising given the large shocks obvious in figure 2, but given
that the objective of this study is to identify these historical shocks, we do not attempt to
correct for it in our VAR analysis. As the residuals are highly non-normal, RESET tests for
omitted non-linearities were applied equation-by-equation, but no evidence of non-linearity
was found. Despite the sample being relatively long, the estimates are remarkably stable,
as illustrated by the CUSUM plots of the cumulative sum of the recursive residuals, as well
as recursive parameter estimate plots presented in appendix A. The CUSUM plot for the
inflation equation in figure A2 can be compared to its equivalent from a VAR estimated
with intercepts in figure D1, for evidence that the estimates excluding intercepts are slightly
more stable. This also suggests that no significant non-linearities have been omitted.



































































Figure 3: VAR residuals, 1900 – 2016, with ±1 standard deviation regions shaded in grey.
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complex conjugate eigenvalues equal to 0.17± 0.21i. The eigenvalue equal to 0.98 suggests
a unit root process, providing further support to our exclusion of the intercepts from the
final model, given that neither series has an obvious drift that would be captured by an
intercept term. The complex conjugate eigenvalues imply a business cycle component with
an average period of approximately 7 years, although from figure 2 it is obvious that the
business cycle component does not account for a large part of the variance of unemployment
and inflation in the UK.3 Instead, there are clearly large shocks impacting unemployment
and inflation. These shocks lead to the reduced form residuals plotted in figure 3, from
which the considerable forecast errors during the war periods and 1920s are immediately
apparent. Large inflation forecast errors are also apparent in the late 1940s and early 1950s,
and the late 1970s and early 1980s. Large unemployment forecast errors are visible around
the recessions of the early 1980s, early 1990s, and late 2000s. Using the method outlined
in section 3, these forecast errors will be used to derive a history of aggregate demand and
supply shocks in the next section.
5 A partial history of aggregate demand and supply shocks
Table 1 presents unemployment and inflation residuals and the implied demand and sup-
ply shocks, using the sample of residuals plotted in figure 3 and the identification strategy
outlined in section 3. Only those years for which at least one of the unemployment and in-
flation residuals are greater in magnitude than their respective sample standard deviations
are examined. We provide a detailed historical discussion of the majority of the shocks in
appendix B, and summarise our reasoning in the ‘source’ column in table 1. We first note
that our classification of some of the most well-known events is in line with common interpre-
tations. The World Wars between 1914 – 1918 and 1939 – 1945 are associated with positive
demand shocks, whereas negative demand shocks are present during the Great Depression
in 1930 and 1931 and the Great Recession in 2009. Negative supply shocks are present
following the 1979 oil price shock. Second, we find that there are considerably more large
aggregate demand shocks than large aggregate supply shocks, so on this measure demand
shocks were more important than supply shocks for the evolution of UK unemployment and
inflation between 1900 and 2016. However, we also note that large supply shocks are more
prevalent than large demand shocks after 1970, which is consistent with the results of Liu &
Mumtaz (2011), who find that aggregate supply shocks are relatively important for output
fluctuations using a sample that starts in 1970.
Two of the most interesting episodes are the positive supply shock in 1927, and the neg-
ative supply shock in 1971, whose economic interpretation might be less evident. The 1927
shock, in particular, is rarely included as a ‘textbook’ example of an important macroeco-
nomic shock. We attribute both shocks to changes in the bargaining power of organised
labour. The positive shock in 1927 can be linked to a sudden fall in bargaining power fol-
lowing the 1926 general strike. This strike took place over nine days at the beginning of
May 1926, and followed a long period of failed negotiations over miners’ wages (which had
fallen significantly since the end of the First World War). After the failure of the strike, the
Trade Disputes and Trade Unions Act (1927) and the Unemployment Insurance Act (1927)
were passed. Unions were prevented from acting in a ‘political’ manner, secondary strike
action was made illegal, and,
3A pair of complex conjugate eigenvalues λ = a ± bi imply a sinusoidal component of period
2π/ arctan(b/a), which in this case is 2π/ arctan(0.21/0.17) = 7.058. See Shibayama (2008) for details.
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Table 1: Implied demand and supply shocks
Date v̂ut v̂
π
t Implied demand shock Implied supply shock Source
1900 0.58 4.07 − Commodity prices
1901 0.73 -3.82 − Panic of 1901
1908 2.91 -0.96 − 1907 financial crisis
1910 -1.48 1.51 + ‘People’s Budget’
1915 -2.22 9.86 + First World War
1916 -1.36 6.60 + First World War
1917 -1.07 10.30 + First World War
1918 -1.76 1.96 + First World War
1919 1.45 -7.61 − Fiscal retrenchment
1920 -1.24 8.40 + Global post-war boom
1921 8.24 -21.82 − Gold standard
1922 -1.32 -2.19 + Unknown
1927 -1.74 -1.98 + Bargaining power
1928 1.88 -0.49 − Unknown
1930 4.40 -2.98 − Great Depression
1931 3.32 -0.34 − Great Depression
1938 1.93 -2.95 − Recession in USA
1939 -3.54 1.65 + Second World War
1940 -1.58 11.46 + Second World War
1941 -3.02 -4.61 + Unknown
1946 1.45 0.90 − Unknown
1947 -1.03 5.50 + Unknown
1951 -0.57 5.96 + Korean War
1953 -1.17 -4.56 + Unknown
1971 0.01 4.02 − Bargaining power
1974 -0.30 7.40 + Fiscal expansion
1975 -0.35 9.85 + Fiscal expansion
1978 -0.64 -4.98 + Social contract
1979 0.36 4.56 − Oil prices
1980 0.78 5.48 − Oil prices
1981 1.57 0.09 − Oil prices
1991 1.55 1.178 − Oil prices
2009 1.77 -1.00 − 2008 financial crisis
Notes: Only those years in which at least one of |vut | and |vπt | are greater than their respective
sample standard deviations are displayed. In columns 4 and 5, “+” denotes a positive shock
and “−” denotes a negative shock. World War years are highlighted in grey.
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“What followed was a systematic campaign to tighten up the existing admin-
istration of unemployment insurance. The ‘seeking work’ test, of course, had
already made its mark. By 1927 one in ten of all claimants was being refused
benefit because of an ‘unsatisfactory attitude to work’.” (Garside, 1990, pp. 48).
The ‘seeking work’ test had already been introduced in 1921 and required claimants to show
that they were genuinely seeking work, with unemployed workers being obliged to accept
any work at a reasonable wage. This tightening of unemployment insurance, alongside the
new restrictions on trade union activity, constitute a reduction in bargaining power which
may be taken as the primary source of the observed supply shock in 1927.
The negative supply shock in 1971, by comparison, can be viewed as a reflection of the
positive supply shock in 1927. Whereas the latter shock constituted, to some extent at least,
an exogenous decrease in the bargaining power of workers, the events in 1971 are in part
accounted for by an exogenous increase in the bargaining power of workers. Thus, Nicholas
Woodward observes that,
“By the early 1970s, [wage inflation] had risen to between 12 and 13 per cent.
This wage explosion, moreover, was associated with an apparent upsurge in
labour militancy. For example, over this period there was a rapid increase in
trade union membership from 42.7 per cent of the labour force in 1968 to 47.2
in 1972. At the same time there was a significant increase in strike activity, and
. . . this was reflected in all the main strike indicators.” (Woodward, 1991, pp.
197-198).
Woodward goes on to argue that the usual interpretation of the increase in inflation during
this period is that, “it was the product of autonomous wage pressures”, i.e. a shock to
workers’ bargaining power (Woodward, 1991, pp. 198). Interestingly, unemployment only
increased marginally in 1971, with the bulk of the shock being felt in a large increase in
inflation. This is rather different to 1927, in which the unemployment and inflation rates
both decreased by similar magnitudes, and may reflect institutional differences between the
more managed, high-employment economy that existed in 1971 compared with the relatively
laissez-faire, depressed economy of the 1920s.
A second series of events that is of special interest are the shocks in 1974 and 1975. The
late 1973 to early 1974 spikes in oil prices are often identified as a negative aggregate supply
shock related to the Yom Kippur War, and are commonly used as a textbook case study
(e.g. Blanchard, 2017, pp. 207-208). The interpretation of the mid-1970s as a period of oil
price shocks is also offered in Hendry (2001), based on an econometric model of UK inflation
over the period 1875 – 1991. Hendry (2001) finds that foreign prices were a major driver of
price inflation in 1974 and in 1975, which then triggered domestic wage inflation. Barsky
& Kilian (2001), Kilian (2008) and Antoĺın-Dı́az & Rubio-Ramı́rez (2018) argue that the
1973 events should not be included in a list of exogenous oil market events, as no OPEC
oil facilities were attacked during the Yom Kippur War, and there is scant evidence of oil
production shortfalls caused by the War. But regardless of the exact mechanisms operating
in the oil markets, one would still expect increased oil prices to generate negative supply
pressure in the UK.
Interestingly, our identification approach implies the existence of two positive demand
shocks in 1974 and 1975, and is silent on the sign of any aggregate supply shocks that existed
in these years. The aggregate demand shocks coincide with a continuation of expansionary
fiscal policy in the mid-1970s following the Barber Boom earlier in the decade, and a 250%
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increase in the public sector borrowing requirement between 1974 and 1976 (Tomlinson,
1985, pp. 130). Provided that the mid-1970s oil price crisis did indeed constitute a negative
supply shock, one can interpret this episode in British economic history as a conscious
attempt by the government to mitigate its impact on employment. In November 1974,
discussing the Labour administration’s fiscal response to the oil crisis, the Chancellor Denis
Healey could state in the Commons that,
“Yet there is no real evidence that in this situation the adoption of deflationary
policies will produce a worthwhile impact on the rate of inflation – at any rate
within a time scale that democracy will tolerate.” (quoted in Tomlinson, 1985,
pp. 171).
He went on to argue that, despite Britain being badly affected by the oil crisis, “to adopt
a strategy which requires mass unemployment would be no less an economic than a moral
crime.” (Hansard, 1974).
The foregoing suggests that Healey chose reflationary policy, which may have exacer-
bated inflation but prevented further increases in unemployment, over deflationary policy,
which would have reduced inflation at the expense of increasing unemployment. Artis et al.
(1992) observe that the Labour government’s reliance on incomes policies to mitigate any
inflationary effects of the March 1974 budget was a rational economic strategy, but,
“The package as a whole embodied a high level of risk. It was uncertain what
other countries would do, or to what extent the foreign exchange markets would
finance a UK balance of payments deficit. It was certainly not clear that wage
bargaining in Britain would in the event conform to the needs of the time. The
strategy was full of forecasting problems and uncertainty over theoretical and
empirical relationships.” (Artis et al., 1992, pp. 42).
Despite this, Artis et al. (1992) conclude that the decision to maintain fiscal expenditures
while using incomes policies to limit inflation was reasonable, and its failure was not a
foregone conclusion in the summer of 1974. Eventually, the various iterations of Labour’s
Social Contract under Wilson and Callaghan did have some effect on the inflation rate,
which is reflected in the presence of a positive supply shock in 1978 in table 1. However, the
Social Contract contributed in part to the Winter of Discontent and the fall of the Callaghan
administration, and the incoming Thatcher government heralded the abandonment of full-
employment as a policy goal.
6 An alternative approach: impulse indicator saturation
In this section, we compare and contrast our econometric approach to an alternative method
of dealing with shocks in macroeconomic time series: impulse indicator saturation (IIS). IIS
has been developed in the context of a general-to-specific approach to macroeconometric
modelling that considers a wide range of potential determinants of a time series, both the-
oretical and idiosyncratic, rather than starting from a specific theory. General-to-specific
modelling in this context is a data-driven approach that involves starting from a general un-
restricted model that encompasses multiple explanatory variables as well as a set of dummy
variables to capture idiosyncratic events. Specifically, it is argued that extraneous events
such as wars, natural disasters, policy regime shifts and so forth are typically not captured
by the explanatory variables derived from theoretical models, but can be a major source of
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variance. Not accounting for such shocks can distort parameter estimation and inference.
IIS provides a selection algorithm that helps identify dummy variables that absorb those
shocks. Castle & Hendry (2014) and Santos et al. (2007) are good sources for the statistical
properties of IIS, and Castle & Hendry (2009) Castle et al. (2012) and Hendry & Mizon
(2011) present empirical applications.
More specifically, IIS selects relevant impulse indicators, i.e. dummy variables that are
unity in a specific period and zero otherwise, which absorb shocks that are not captured
by the explanatory variables. In the split-half approach, a subset of size T/2 from a full
set of impulse indicators denoted by It, t = 1, .., T , is included in the regression equation
along with the observable variables, which is then estimated on the T observations. By only
using the first half of the T impulse indicators, it is ensured that there are enough degrees of
freedom to estimate the parameters of the equation. In the next step, the second half of the
impulse indicators is included. Finally, only those indicators that are statistically significant
at a predetermined level are retained to arrive at the desired model.
To compare our approach with IIS, we re-estimate the VAR in unemployment and infla-
tion from section 4 using IIS to select a set of statistically significant impulse dummies. IIS
has so far mostly been used in a single-equation context. In order to apply it to our bivariate
VAR, we simply retain indicators whenever they are statistically significant in either one or





Aizt−i + βtIt + εt, (6)
and the forecasts errors augmented by the impulse indicators are,
zt − E[zt|zt−1, ..., zt−p] = A−1βtIt + A−1εt = btIt + vt, (7)





′ are the reduced form innovations, It are the impulse indicators selected





′ are the reduced form parameters on the impulse indicators.
Comparison of (7) with (3) shows that the large shocks will be captured by btIt, with the











periods in which indicators are selected. As a result, we can interpret the IIS results in the
same way that we interpret the large forecast errors in section 5, with v̂t replaced with b̂t.
Table 2 summarises the main results, in which the impulse indicators are selected using
a significance level of 5%; the full results are reported in Appendix C. The table includes
the date of each selected impulse indicator, the reduced-form parameter estimates on the
indicator for each equation, and the signs of the implied aggregate demand or supply shock
identified using the theory-based sign restrictions discussed above. In addition, the sixth
column indicates whether the implied demand or supply shock is consistent with the implied
shock in table 1. With a 5% significance level, 34 impulse indicators are retained, of which
26 match the corresponding shocks in table 1, 7 are not included in table 1, and only one
shock is inconsistent with the corresponding shock in table 1.4 This is the 1946 shock, which
is identified as a negative supply shock in table 1 and a negative demand shock in table 2,
for which – as discussed in appendix B – there is no obvious explanation. Overall, therefore,
4With a statistical significance level of 10%, 45 indicators, and with a 1% level only 16 indicators are
retained, see Appendix C.
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Table 2: Implied demand and supply shocks, impulse indicator saturation
Date b̂ut b̂
π
t Implied demand shock Implied supply shock Match with table 1
1900 0.56 3.36 − 3
1901 0.68 -4.23 − 3
1904 1.17 -1.95 − Not in table 1
1908 2.98 -1.24 − 3
1910 -1.51 1.29 + 3
1911 -0.25 -2.93 + Not in table 1
1913 -0.22 -2.78 + Not in table 1
1915 -2.24 9.35 + 3
1916 -1.11 7.02 + 3
1917 -1.08 10.51 + 3
1918 -1.85 2.50 + 3
1919 1.31 -7.40 − 3
1920 -1.72 7.44 + 3
1921 8.34 -21.41 − 3
1922 -2.66 -5.19 + 3
1923 0.585 2.79 − Not in table 1
1927 -1.80 -2.21 + 3
1928 2.18 -0.35 − 3
1930 4.46 -3.13 − 3
1931 2.86 -1.19 − 3
1938 2.23 -2.30 − 3
1939 -3.67 1.50 + 3
1940 -1.05 12.28 + 3
1941 -2.60 -3.35 + 3
1942 0.14 -3.20 − Not in table 1
1943 -0.07 -3.55 + Not in table 1
1946 1.25 -0.25 − 7
1947 -1.40 4.21 + 3
1949 -0.63 -4.08 + Not in table 1
1951 -0.74 5.09 + 3
1953 -1.37 -4.99 + 3
1974 -0.23 7.54 + 3
1975 -0.36 10.28 + 3
1980 0.83 5.91 − 3
Notes: Indicators were selected using a 5% significance level. In column 6, 3 denotes a match
with table 1 and 7 denotes a mismatch. The identification of shocks is based on the method
discussed in section 3 and does not follow from IIS.
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there is a strong correspondence with the shocks identified in section 5, particularly when
using the 5% threshold.
This exercise shows that the history of significant shocks presented in section 5 is robust
to the method used to identify large forecast errors. However, it is import to stress that IIS
is a data-driven approach that – by itself – does not provide any interpretation of the shocks
captured by the impulse indicators. In practice, the latter are often discussed in an ad-hoc
fashion. For example, in a study of UK real wages over the period 1863 to 2004, Castle &
Hendry (2009, p.20) use IIS to select indicator variables for the years 1918, 1940, 1975 and
1977. These are interpreted as extraneous shocks associated with the first and second World
War, the first oil crisis and incomes policies, respectively, but the IIS algorithm itself does
not allow the authors to assign any further economic meaning to these shocks. By contrast,
the theory-driven approach taken in this paper offers an economic interpretation of major
shock events through the lens of an AD-AS model. While these shocks are indeed often
associated with known extraneous events such as wars and global crises (see the discussion
in section 5 and appendix B), their specific macroeconomic impact is typically not self-
evident. By using sign restrictions derived from an AD-AS model, we are able to say more
about the supply- or demand-side effects of major shocks.
7 Concluding remarks
In this paper, we have presented an interpretation of the history of aggregate demand and
supply shocks in the United Kingdom from a Keynesian perspective. To achieve this, we
have proposed a simple yet rarely used method to infer the signs of structural shocks from
the reduced-form residuals of a VAR model, using minimal identification assumptions. Our
approach utilises the sign restrictions implied by the aggregate demand/aggregate supply
model that can be derived from the workhorse New Keynesian model and a variety of other
macroeconomic models, including Old Keynesian neoclassical synthesis and Post Keynesian
models. We have also demonstrated that our approach is robust to changes in the method
used to select major shocks.
Our results include the identification of World War years as positive aggregate demand
shocks, the Great Depression and Great Recession as negative aggregate demand shocks,
and the identification of the 1979 oil price events as a negative aggregate supply shock.
Overall, we find a greater role for aggregate demand shocks, rather than aggregate supply
shocks, in British macroeconomic history. We also uncover some interesting events which
are less well-known, including aggregate supply shocks in 1927 and 1971. These correspond
to labour market reforms in the aftermath of the 1926 General Strike and a period of
heightened union militancy, respectively. The negative supply shock in 1971 was primarily
associated with a steep rise in inflation, without any significant effect on the unemployment
rate. It was followed by positive aggregate demand pressure in the mid-1970s alongside
the introduction of various incomes policies. We attribute this positive demand shock to
expansionary fiscal policy in the face of adverse international pressure, providing a new
perspective on an otherwise well-known event. After 1979, our history is dominated by
negative aggregate supply shocks until the Great Recession in 2009, which is the last major
shock we identify.
While previous research has often relied on relatively strong theoretical assumptions
to achieve identification (e.g. Bergman 1996; Karras 1993, 1994; Liu & Mumtaz 2011;
Stuart 2019), we show that sign restrictions can provide economically interesting information
with much weaker assumptions. Our approach could easily be applied to other countries,
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particularly those with long historical time series and a well documented historical record.
The USA and France are ideal candidates, as both of of these countries have long, reliable
time series data and a great deal of documented economic history. At the same time, in
order to further explore the applicability of the AD-AS model to the UK, it may be worth
applying other identification methods such as identification by heteroskedasticity or non-
normality. As far as we are aware, neither of these methods having been applied to historical
UK time series data, and the heteroskedasticity and normality test results reported in this
paper suggest that they may well be useful. Finally, we note that the incorporation of more
information in our identification method, for example the assumption of independent shocks,
might result in more detailed inference. We leave these avenues to future research.
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Figure A4: Recursive parameter estimates, inflation equation.
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B Detailed discussion of shocks in table 1
B.1 1900 - 1901
Willard Long Thorp, in an exhaustive narrative account of business cycle conditions from
1790 to 1925, describes 1900 as a prosperous year, leading to recession in the Summer, with,
“Activity and progress, first half-year, yield to dullness and decline, summer;
gradual increase in unemployment; commodity prices reach peak and the decline;
coal prices extremely high; big increase in volume of foreign trade, slackening
later in year . . . Money tight, with large government loans floated; stock market
unsteady with rapid rise in industrial stocks, first quarter, and boom in American
railways . . . Smaller crops, except oats; higher prices . . . War continued with
increasing demands for men and materials; British successes begin, March.”
(Thorp, 1926, pp. 173).
The war that Thorp refers to is the Boer War, which was declared the preceding year. The
high commodities prices, with higher crop prices due to a poor harvest, may be taken as
the source of the negative supply shock in table 1. Thorp describes 1901, the year of Queen
Victoria’s death, as a mild depression, with,
“Continued recession; some shrinkage in volume of activity, but chiefly in prices;
construction industry severely curtailed; decline in prices and wages; increased
unemployment; volume of foreign trade unchanged, but value decline marked.”
(Thorp, 1926, pp. 173).
It is not clear how Thorp differentiates between the volume and value of foreign trade, but
the Bank of England dataset from which the VAR data is drawn in section 4 shows a decrease
in the real value of exports in 1901. This may be taken as evidence of a negative demand
shock emanating from the 1901 panic on the New York Stock Exchange. Although Thorp
notes that the money market was “firm” in 1901, “industrial stocks reach peak, March, and
decline rapidly”, which provides further evidence for this interpretation of the demand shock
in 1901 (Thorp, 1926, pp. 173).
B.2 1908
The negative aggregate demand shock in 1908 listed in table 1 can easily be explained by
the 1907 financial crisis in the USA, which took place in October and the beginning of
November of that year. This was the high point of pre-war globalisation, and as pointed
out in Thomas et al. (2010),
“The UK business cycle became more closely aligned with external factors as
international linkages became more important following the widespread adoption
of the gold standard system of fixed exchange rates. Consequently . . . the UK
economy was vulnerable to international financial crises, such as the 1907 US
financial crisis.” (Thomas et al., 2010).
Willard Long Thorp, in his account of business cycle conditions, describes 1908 as a depres-
sion, with,
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“Marked and rapid decline in all branches of industry; stagnation; severe un-
employment reaches peak, autumn; many wage reductions; severe engineering
strike, summer, and general lockout in Lancashire cotton industry, autumn;
many failures; large reduction in volume of foreign trade.” (Thorp, 1926, pp.
175).
Thus, sharp reduction in foreign trade, driven in the main by the 1907 financial crisis, marks
this period out as suffering from a severe negative aggregate demand shock, although the
“dull” stock exchange and declining stock prices also point to a degree of financial contagion
from the crisis (Thorp, 1926, pp. 175).
B.3 1910
Unemployment, having risen to 7.08% in 1908 and 7.51% in 1909, fell back to 5.77% in
1910 during the recovery from the previous recession. Inflation rose from 0.19% to 2.12%
from 1909 to 1910, leading to the positive aggregate demand shock listed in table 1. This
period is, of course, before any attempts at active demand management by the Government,
and the Bank Rate was steady at 4.5% between 1909 and 1910. However, 1910 did see the
passage of Lloyd George’s ‘People’s Budget’, which was to be a central plank of his war on
poverty. This budget was redistributionary whilst being relatively budget-neutral, although
it is worth noting that public sector net lending was negative in 1909, after being positive
for the previous two years. Thus,
“[Lloyd George] described his Budget as a ‘war budget’ for waging ‘implacable
warfare against poverty and squalidness’. His friends hailed it as ‘the People’s
Budget’; his enemies saw it as being a war budget against property and de-
nounced it as socialistic.” (Peden, 1991, pp. 25).
As a matter of fact, the increased taxation in the ‘People’s Budget’ did not fall on the working
or middle classes, and instead were made up of super-taxes and land value taxes on those
parts of the income distribution which may be assumed to have a low marginal propensity
to consume out of current income. If we allow for a stimulating effect of redistribution –
particularly during an era of extreme inequality – then the ‘People’s Budget’ may account
for the positive aggregate demand shock listed in table 1.
B.4 1915 – 1918
The positive aggregate demand shocks in 1915 – 1918 listed in table 1 are, of course, ex-
plained by the First World War. During this period, government expenditure and borrowing
rapidly increased to pay for the war effort. At the same time, the Gold Standard was sus-
pended, allowing substantial increases in money stocks and credit aggregates – although the
Bank rate was actually higher during the War than directly preceding it. This is still the era
of public finance that pre-dates demand management. Treasury officials in 1914 were quick
to advise Lloyd George – still the Chancellor of the Exchequer – that in the past, “nearly
half the cost of wars had been met from taxation”, and that he should not rely too heavily
on borrowing (Peden, 1991, pp. 38-40). However,
“Lloyd George, who cared very little for conventional financial wisdom, chose
not to follow this advice, and set himself the more modest task of raising enough
revenue to pay for normal expenditure in peace, plus a margin to pay for the
interest on loans raised to pay for the war.” (Peden, 1991, pp. 40).
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Hence the succession of large aggregate demand shocks from 1915 – 1918, which apparently
constituted a novel event in the history of British war financing.
B.5 1919 – 1922
The UK in 1919 – 1922 underwent a sequence of varied shocks according to table 1, with a
negative demand shock in 1919, a positive demand shock in 1920, a negative demand shock
in 1921, and a positive supply shock in 1922. This reflects the extreme volatility in this
period, where inflation fell from 22% to 10.1% from 1918 to 1919, jumping back to 15.4%
in 1920, then falling in the deflationary years of the 1920s to -8.6% and -14% in 1921 and
1922. Similarly, the unemployment rate jumped from 0.65% in 1918 to 3.02% in 1919, fell
back to 1.95% in 1920, before rising to 11.02% in 1921 and 9.68% in 1922.
The negative demand shock in 1919 implied by these movements in inflation and unem-
ployment can easily be explained by the end of the First World War. Government consump-
tion, unsurprisingly, fell rapidly between 1918 and 1919, and public sector borrowing, having
risen continuously during the War, was also heavily cut back in 1919. At the same time,
the positive labour supply shock resulting from demobilisation at the end of 1918 and 1919
should not be discounted as a partial explanation of the unexpected rise in unemployment
during 1919, and in principle this goes some way in accounting for the unexpected fall in
inflation.
The positive demand shock of 1920 can be assigned to the post-war boom, driven in
the main by an expansion of trade and shipping following the end of the War. In turn, the
major deflation of the early 1920s is usually attributed to monetary and fiscal austerity in an
attempt to return to the Gold Standard at pre-war parity, which was eventually achieved in
1925. Both the bank rate and gilt rates increased from 1919 to 1920, with both the nominal
and real exchange rates rising rapidly from 1921 onwards. Even more dramatic was the
increase in the real interest rate, which rose precipitously from 1920 to 1921. These events
may be taken as proximate causes of the 1921 negative demand shock, although the scale
of the deflation is still quite impressive given the relatively modest movements in monetary
and fiscal policy.
B.6 1927 – 1928
1927 and 1928, according to table 1, saw a positive supply shock and negative demand
shock, respectively. The positive aggregate supply shock in 1927 can partly be explained
by a sudden fall in the bargaining power of workers following the 1926 general strike, after
which the Trade Disputes and Trade Unions Act (1927) and the Unemployment Insurance
Act (1927) were passed. The former Act incorporated a number of provisions to prevent
unions acting in a “political” manner, including restrictions on union funding of the Labour
Party, and made secondary strike action illegal. The latter Act did, in principle, embody
a number of provisions which would improve the welfare of unemployed workers. However,
it also required all claimants to prove that they were seeking work. As the costs and
associated debt of the Unemployment Fund increased, this led the government to tighten
up the eligibility process. Thus,
“What followed was a systematic campaign to tighten up the existing admin-
istration of unemployment insurance. The ‘seeking work’ test, of course, had
already made its mark. By 1927 one in ten of all claimants was being refused
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benefit because of an ‘unsatisfactory attitude to work’. But thereafter the test
was applied with particular severity.” (Garside, 1990, pp. 48).
This tightening of the administration of unemployment insurance, alongside the new restric-
tions on trade union activity, constitute a clear reduction in bargaining power which may
be taken to contributed to the observed supply shock in 1927. The source of the negative
demand shock in 1928, meanwhile, is not as clear, as it pre-dates the 1929 Wall Street crisis.
B.7 1930 – 1931
The rapid increases in unemployment and the rate of deflation experienced in the early
1930s, leading to the implied negative demand shocks in table 1, are straightforwardly
attributable to the Great Depression that followed the 1929 Wall Street crisis. As in 1907 –
1908, the effects of the Depression were transmitted through collapses in trade and capital
flows, although the UK economy, having never fully recovered from the volatility of the
1920s, started out from a low base. Whether or not the continued collapse of trade volumes
constituted an endogenous response to the crisis, or a secondary exogenous shock resulting
from the imposition of trade barriers, is controversial. However, it is worth noting that the
Hawley-Smoot Tariff Act of 1930 in the USA and the Abnormal Importation Act of 1931 in
the UK coincide with the negative demand shocks listed in table 1 during this period. At
the end of this period, a final negative demand shock occurred in the form of a deflationary
budget, with unemployment benefits and public sector wages both cut by the incumbent
Labour government. As well as adding further deflationary pressure to the economy, this
resulted in a political crisis and National Government at the end of 1931.
B.8 1938
Re-armament in preparation for the Second World War is generally considered to be the
proximate cause behind the recovery in employment after the early 1930s. However, tight
fiscal and monetary policy by the Roosevelt administration during this period led to a
recession from 1937 – 1938 in the USA, which may be taken to be the source of the negative
aggregate demand shock in table 1 in 1938. Thus Harry Richardson, in Economic Recovery
in Britain 1932 – 1939, argues that,
“There had been a lull in the American recovery from the end of 1936, Wall
Street had looked very shaky at least since the spring of 1937 and industrial
activity in the United States turned downwards in the late Summer. In Britain,
on the other hand, some indicators continued to move upwards while others fell in
the second half of 1937, and only at the end of the year was a check to recovery
generally admitted. On first sight, it looks as if this is the usual sequence of
recession being transmitted to the United Kingdom from the United States.”
(Richardson, 1967, pp. 31).
Richardson goes on to argue that the recession of 1937-8 was, “as much due to internal
causes as to depression abroad” (Richardson, 1967, pp. 31). But we are chiefly interested
in the exogenous movements here; internal movements (i.e., those predictable given the
information set) are already taken into account in the VAR model.
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B.9 1939 – 1941
As with the positive aggregate demand shocks from 1915 – 1918, the positive aggregate
demand shocks in 1939 and 1940 are easily attributable to the increases in government ex-
penditure and borrowing to pay for the Second World War. The return to a full employment
War economy via planning is also of obvious importance, and a sudden increase in centrally
planned employment allocation alongside price controls would manifest itself as a demand
shock given our identification assumptions, even though the New Keynesian model does not
reflect these institutional arrangements. The positive aggregate supply shock of 1941 listed
in table 1 is somewhat more puzzling, and coincides with the sharp decrease in the inflation
rate during this period.
B.10 1946 – 1947
According to table 1, the UK suffered a negative supply shock in 1946 and enjoyed a positive
demand shock in 1947. The negative supply shock is difficult to square with historical
events. On the face of it, one would expect a negative demand shock to have occurred at
the close of the War, as in 1919. Government expenditure and borrowing were reduced with
demobilisation, and the latter should have been expected to reduce inflation alongside the
increase in unemployment. At the same time, the economy was still subject to widespread
planning, import quotas, and price control during this period, and as noted above the New
Keynesian model is not designed to account for movements in prices and employment under
these institutional arrangements.
Unfortunately, the positive demand shock of 1947 in table 1 is as difficult to account for
as the negative supply shock of 1946. One of the most well known events in 1947 is the coal
crisis at the beginning of the year. Cairncross (1985), for example, notes that a large part
of the manufacturing industry had to shut down for lack of power during the crisis, leading
to a shortage of steel and other materials. Similarly, Dow (1964) reports that the crisis led
to the weekly press being halted for two weeks, and that the disruption of production led
to a reduction of £200 million in export earnings (Dow, 1964, pp. 22). This is a classic
example of a supply shock, but, according to table 1, unemployment was unexpectedly low
in this year. Again, the transitory nature of this period, as well as the multitude of controls
and quotas in force, apparently make it difficult for the AD-AS model’s predicted shocks to
square well with the narrative record.
B.11 1951
In contrast to the ambiguity of the immediate post-war years, the period 1950-51 is a classic
episode of high aggregate demand pressure, caused in the main by the outbreak of the
Korean War. As Dow (1964) notes,
“In a world already heading for a boom, this caused the sharpest burst of inflation
in the post-war period, and world-wide shortage of materials. To the United
Kingdom it brought rising prices; a major increase in defence spending; and
within a year, a balance of payments crisis.” (Dow, 1964, pp. 54-55).
Thus, part of the 1951 positive aggregate demand shock listed in table 1 can be attributed
to a sharp increase in global aggregate demand, and part can be attributed to an increase in
domestic defence expenditure. At the same time, as Dow points out, both the rapid recovery
of Western Germany in 1949-1950 and the recovery of the USA from its 1949 recession had
put a great deal of pressure on raw materials prices during this period.
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B.12 1953
By 1953 the economic repercussions of the Korean boom had come to an end, and the post-
war consensus of Butskellism in demand management was firmly established. Whereas the
sources of the 1951 demand shock are quite obvious, there is no obvious global or domestic
event in 1953 that corresponds to the positive aggregate supply shock listed in table 3.
However, Dow (1964) notes that falling import prices had, “greatly slowed down the rise in
retail prices”, which is consistent with the large negative inflation residual in 1953 (Dow,
1964, pp. 75).
B.13 1971
1971 is an interesting year, as the negative supply shock can potentially be viewed as a
reflection of the positive supply shock in 1927. Whereas the latter shock reflected, to some
extent at least, an exogenous decrease in the bargaining power of workers, the events in
1971 are in part accounted for by an exogenous increase in the bargaining power of workers.
Thus, Nicholas Woodward observes that,
“By the early 1970s, [wage inflation] had risen to between 12 and 13 per cent.
This wage explosion, moreover, was associated with an apparent upsurge in
labour militancy. For example, over this period there was a rapid increase in
trade union membership from 42.7 per cent of the labour force in 1968 to 47.2
in 1972. At the same time there was a significant increase in strike activity, and
. . . this was reflected in all the main strike indicators.” (Woodward, 1991, pp.
197-198).
Woodward goes on to argue that the usual interpretation of the increase in inflation during
this period is that, “it was the product of autonomous wage pressures”, i.e. a shock to
workers’ bargaining power (Woodward, 1991, pp. 198). Despite the existence of monetarist
counter-arguments, it is worth noting that days lost to strikes in 1971 were the highest they
had been since the General Strike of 1926 – although the miners’ strikes of 1972, 1974, and
1984 would all see a greater number of days lost, as would the Winter of Discontent.
B.14 1974 – 1975
Interestingly, the Barber Boom of the early 1970s is not listed in table 1, and one might
imagine that 1974, at least, would show the negative effects of the 1973 Yom Kippur War and
subsequent OPEC embargo as a negative aggregate supply shock. However, as discussed in
more detail in the main body of text, it is well established that UK fiscal policy was expan-
sionary during 1974, with a 250% increase in the public sector borrowing requirement from
1974 – 1976 coinciding with a “crisis of public expenditure” in the mid-1970s (Tomlinson,
1985, pp. 130). In November of 1974, in the face of a sharp increase in inflation, the Labour
Chancellor Denis Healey could state that,
“Yet there is no real evidence that in this situation the adoption of deflationary
policies will produce a worthwhile impact on the rate of inflation – at any rate
within a time scale that democracy will tolerate.” (quoted in Tomlinson, 1985,
pp. 171).
Participants in the bond market appeared to have disagreed, with a market consensus that
government borrowing was too high during this period leading to a gilt strike in 1976 (Tom-
linson, 1985, pp. 132). In addition, figure 1 in Cloyne (2013) shows a number of exogenous
32
(and endogenous) tax cuts during the early to mid-1970s that are derived from the UK bud-
get statements published during this period. Thus the positive aggregate demand shocks
in 1974 and 1975 listed in table 1 can be explained by (relatively) expansionary fiscal pol-
icy, which in turn can be interpreted as a conscious attempt by the Labour government to
mitigate the impact on employment of the negative cost pressures induced by the 1973-4 oil
price crisis.
B.15 1978
Inflation fell continuously in the UK from 1975 to 1978, with the largest fall between 1977 and
1978. Whilst the relative stability in the dollar oil price from 1975 to 1978 will mechanically
serve to reduce consumer price inflation, in itself it does not constitute the positive supply
shock listed in table 1. Instead, we can attribute this shock to Labour’s Social Contract, in
which unions limited wage increases in return for various pieces of legislation (see Backhouse
& Forder (2013) for a brief history of post-war incomes policies and their rationale). This
policy coincided with the 1975 to 1978 period of falling inflation, and although it can hardly
be considered as unexpected by the general public – it contributed, in part, to the Winter
of Discontent – it is certainly not the type of systematic macroeconomic policy that can be
considered endogenous in a parsimonious model. It can therefore be taken as an example,
albeit an unusual example, of a negative aggregate supply shock.
B.16 1979 – 1981
The obvious explanation for the negative supply shocks listed in table 3 in 1979, 1980,
and 1981 are the start of the Iranian revolution (December 1978 to January 1979) and
the outbreak of the Iran-Iraq War (September 1980 to October 1980). These events are
discussed in the context of identifying oil market shocks in Antoĺın-Dı́az & Rubio-Ramı́rez
(2018), and the subsequent oil price rises are generally acknowledged to be the proximate
causes of the increases in unemployment and inflation in the UK during this period.
B.17 1991
The recession in the early 1990s saw inflation jumping from 5.23% in 1989 to 6.97% in
1990, and then to 7.53% in 1991, before falling back to 4.26% in 1992. Unemployment
also increased from 1990 to 1991, but did not peak until 1993, at 10.37%. These shifts
in unemployment and inflation, with the former lagging the latter, explain the implied
negative supply shock in table 1. Ironically, this recession followed the “Lawson Boom” in
which extensive supply side reforms were believed to have paved the way for a prolonged
expansion. Thus Nigel Lawson, in his 1988 budget speech, could confidently state that,
“The plain fact is that the British economy has been transformed. Prudent
financial policies have given business and industry the confidence to expand,
while supply side reforms have progressively removed the barriers to enterprise.”5
However, the boom led to bust, with house prices reaching their peak in 1989. Whilst
the bulk of the events around this period point towards a natural end to an expansion,
including the fall in house prices, and some negative aggregate demand shocks, including
5From Lawson’s 1988 budget speech – see e.g. the speech archive at Margaret Thatcher Foundation
website, www.margaretthatcher.org.
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the ERM entrance in 1990 and deflationary monetary policy from 1992 onwards, the negative
aggregate supply shock in table 1 can be explained by the adverse oil price shock engendered
by the outbreak of the first Gulf War in August 1990. This view of the recession was not
uncommon at the time, for example,
“Although special factors (food, oil) are partly to blame, the main reason for
the scale and tenacity of today’s inflation problem is undoubtedly the vibrant
nature of the Lawson Boom. That boom, one of the most vigorous of all post-
war upturns, left a lingering legacy of inflation which finds expression in an
oversized balance-of-payments deficit, persistent capacity problems, and, by Eu-
ropean standards, an untypically low level of unemployment.” (Martin, 1991,
pp. 29).
As in 1938, therefore, the bulk of the 1991 recession is explainable by internal developments,
with a negative shock exacerbating the situation.
B.18 2009
The last large shock listed in table 1 is the negative aggregate demand shock in 2009. This
coincides with a significant global recession, which followed the financial crisis of 2008. As
with the negative demand shocks following the 1907 financial crisis and the Great Depression
in the early 1930s, the source of this shock was the USA, with its effects being transmitted
through financial contagion channels between Wall Street and the City of London. At the
same time, global trade volumes rapidly contracted, with the Baltic Dry Index collapsing
between the end of 2008 and the beginning of 2009. Unlike during the Great Depression,
however, a large coordinated response from governments and central banks prevented the
recession turning into a depression, explaining the lack of any further negative shocks in
table 1 after 2009.
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C VAR estimation with impulse indicator saturation
Table C3: VAR(2) in unemployment and inflation rate, impulse indicator satu-
ration
< 10% < 10% < 5% < 5% < 1% < 1%
ut πt ut πt ut πt
ut−1 1.514*** -0.581*** 1.394*** -0.509*** 1.448*** -0.973***
(0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000)
ut−2 -0.560*** 0.485*** -0.469*** 0.436*** -0.523*** 0.946***
(0.000) (0.006) (0.000) (0.003) (0.000) (0.000)
πt−1 0.129*** 0.755*** 0.128*** 0.697*** 0.085*** 0.893***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
πt−2 -0.103*** -0.009 -0.079*** 0.036 -0.062*** -0.092
(0.000) (0.878) (0.000) (0.505) (0.001) (0.279)
1900 0.588 3.575*** 0.564 3.364***
(0.153) (0.002) (0.225) (0.008)
1901 0.586 -4.414*** 0.681 -4.226***
(0.163) (0.000) (0.148) (0.001)
1904 1.003** -1.852* 1.170** -1.949





1908 2.953*** -1.265 2.976*** -1.241 3.003*** -1.854
(0.000) (0.258) (0.000) (0.321) (0.000) (0.440)
1909 -0.914** -0.145
(0.041) (0.906)
1910 -1.696*** 1.536 -1.507*** 1.287 -1.628*** 1.595
(0.000) (0.172) (0.001) (0.302) (0.003) (0.506)
1911 -0.220 -2.987*** -0.250 -2.929**
(0.597) (0.009) (0.592) (0.021)
1913 -0.226 -2.864** -0.224 -2.777**
(0.581) (0.011) (0.628) (0.027)
1915 -2.236*** 9.291*** -2.237*** 9.348*** -2.199*** 8.866***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
1916 -0.856* 6.330*** -1.114** 7.015***
(0.074) (0.000) (0.032) (0.000)
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Table C4: VAR(2) in unemployment and inflation rate, impulse indicator satu-
ration (continued)
< 10% < 10% < 5% < 5% < 1% < 1%
ut πt ut πt ut πt
1917 -0.717 10.007*** -1.082** 10.505*** -0.562 8.535***
(0.119) (0.000) (0.032) (0.000) (0.328) (0.001)
1918 -1.432*** 1.879 -1.850*** 2.497*
(0.004) (0.165) (0.001) (0.090)
1919 1.895*** -7.500*** 1.309** -7.395*** 1.742*** -8.113***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.011) (0.000) (0.003) (0.002)
1920 -1.463*** 8.047*** -1.719*** 7.442*** -1.863*** 9.657***
(0.003) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.002) (0.000)
1921 8.644*** -21.841*** 8.341*** -21.406*** 8.808*** -23.459***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
1922 -3.382*** -3.287 -2.661*** -5.188** -3.860*** 2.888
(0.000) (0.141) (0.001) (0.014) (0.000) (0.418)
1923 0.274 3.380*** 0.585 2.792**





1927 -2.092*** -1.903* -1.803*** -2.214* -1.976*** -1.648
(0.000) (0.097) (0.000) (0.079) (0.000) (0.495)
1928 2.181*** -0.180 2.177*** -0.351 2.107*** -0.979
(0.000) (0.876) (0.000) (0.784) (0.000) (0.688)
1930 4.304*** -2.933*** 4.459*** -3.133** 4.353*** -3.142
(0.000) (0.009) (0.000) (0.012) (0.000) (0.190)
1931 2.202*** -0.613 2.862*** -1.188 2.461*** 1.037










Table C5: VAR(2) in unemployment and inflation rate, impulse indicator satu-
ration (continued)
< 10% < 10% < 5% < 5% < 1% < 1%
ut πt ut πt ut πt
1938 2.196*** -2.356** 2.230*** -2.298* 2.363*** -3.713
(0.000) (0.039) (0.000) (0.070) (0.000) (0.125)
1939 -3.957*** 1.855 -3.670*** 1.503 -3.824*** 2.274
(0.000) (0.109) (0.000) (0.235) (0.000) (0.349)
1940 -0.823* 12.159*** -1.050** 12.283***
(0.071) (0.000) (0.033) (0.000)
1941 -2.359*** -4.256*** -2.600*** -3.352** -1.864*** -7.488***
(0.000) (0.003) (0.000) (0.029) (0.003) (0.005)
1942 0.725 -3.124** 0.144 -3.195**
(0.139) (0.020) (0.775) (0.020)
1943 0.262 -3.480*** -0.072 -3.550***
(0.544) (0.003) (0.879) (0.006)
1946 1.327*** -0.262 1.248*** -0.252
(0.001) (0.817) (0.007) (0.842)
1947 -1.504*** 4.293*** -1.402*** 4.207*** -1.487*** 5.003**
(0.000) (0.000) (0.003) (0.001) (0.008) (0.041)
1949 -0.484 -4.159*** -0.634 -4.079***
(0.239) (0.000) (0.171) (0.001)
1950 0.701* 0.591
(0.097) (0.610)
1951 -0.718* 5.060*** -0.741 5.092***
(0.079) (0.000) (0.109) (0.000)
1953 -1.269*** -5.098*** -1.373*** -4.992***
(0.002) (0.000) (0.003) (0.000)
1974 -0.077 7.379*** -0.234 7.536***
(0.853) (0.000) (0.616) (0.000)
1975 -0.219 9.882*** -0.357 10.281***
(0.619) (0.000) (0.471) (0.000)
1979 0.586 4.976***
(0.187) (0.000)
1980 0.885** 5.713*** 0.826* 5.910***
(0.035) (0.000) (0.081) (0.000)
Constant 0.160 1.375*** 0.202* 1.391*** 0.287** 1.079*
(0.158) (0.000) (0.095) (0.000) (0.031) (0.063)
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Figure D2: Scatter matrix and kernel densities for residuals from VAR models estimated
with and without intercepts.
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